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COMMENTS AND CASE NOTES
A constitutional argument, that preventive de-
tention punishes an accused without a trial, is not
overpowering. One answer is that the bail system
in some jurisdictions detains those who apparently
pose a threat to the community. 9 The prime ex-
amples are persons accused of first degree murder,
who are often denied bail. Another answer is that
preventive detention, by way of civil commitment
proceedings, has generally met no constitutional
barrier partly because it is not a means of punish-
ing the defendant but of safe-guarding the public. 6O
If preventive detention in the proposed system is
used for the same purposes, then it also should be
held constitutional, especially if the detainees are
not placed in a facility housing convicted criminals.
Those who are ultimately detained should be
tried quickly. To insure a speedy trial, a time
limit should be imposed, and upon its expiration
the accused should be freed pending trial, unless
he caused the delay. A speedy trial requirement
will forestall any use of the preventive detention
system as a means to keep undesirables out of
circulation. It will also help to make the system
unavailable for use as a means of punishment.
Another requirement, which some feel will con-
strain the state to bring the preventive detainee
to trial quickly, is to deduct detention time from
9 E.g., Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662 (Doug-
las, Cir. J., 1962).60 FREED & WA, supra n. I at 85 n. 30.
his sentence or pay him a per diem rate if he is
not convicted. Valid objections to such a sug-
gestion may be raised. In the first place, if de-
tention pending trial is not viewed as punishment,
then it should not act to mitigate punishment.
Secondly, the mere payment of money will be
small solace to a detainee who is found not guilty.
However, the greatest objection is that the time
deduction and liquidated damages aspects of the
plan could influence the enforcement officials and
the courts in an undesirable manner. They might
too freely detain on the theory that the detainee,
whether guilty or innocent, is not grievously
harmed by detention. Such an outlook destroys
the entire pretrial release system, which should
operate to free all who can be freed.
The suggested system does away with monetary
bail. Bail arose and flowered during a period when
the law had little regard for the rights of the poor.6'
Debtors prisons flourished. Workhouses were used
to contain paupers, who were considered a moral
pestilence. The adherence to the archaic system
of monetary bail is inconsistent with our present
legal thinking. The monetary bail system can not
long survive the recent recognition of the precept
that a poor man is entitled to the same justice as
the wealthy man.6'
61Foote, supra n. 7 at 989-92.
6 See genera11 WAmr., LAw AND Pov-R y (1965).
CASE NOTE
An editorial comment accompanying a Note represents the opinion of the student who pre-




Confessions Coerced Where Made Under Threat
Of Dismissal-Garrity v. New Jersey, 87 S.CT. 616
(1967). Defendants who were police officers, were
convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice in the
state court. On certiorari to the Supreme Court
they contended that their confessions were ob-
tained by coercion when they were given a choice
of testifying against themselves or losing their jobs,
under a New Jersey statute dealing with forfeiture
of jobs of public employees who refuse to testify on
ground of self incrimination.
The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Douglas writing
for the majority, held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbade the states from using the threat of
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discharge to secure incriminatory evidence against
an employee. In the words of the Court:
The choice given appellants was either to for-
feit their jobs or to incriminate themselves.
The option to lose their means of livelihood or
to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the
antithesis of free choice to speak out or to
remain silent. That practice, like interrogation
practices we reviewed in Miranda v. State of
Arizona,... is "likely to exert such pressure
upon an individual as to disable him from
making a free and rational choice." We think
the confessions were infected by the coercion
inherent in this scheme of questioning and
cannot be sustained as voluntary under our
prior decisions. (87 S.Ct. 618-619).
Submission Of A No-merit Letter By Court Ap-
pointed Counsel On Appeal Does Not Satisfy
Constitutional Requirements-Antders v. Cali-
fornia, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967). Defendant was con-
victed of the possession of marijuana and appealed.
His court appointed counsel, after reviewing the
case, advised the court that the appeal had no
merit. The defendant wished to proceed with the
appeal and asked for another lawyer but was
refused. After losing his self-defended appeal he
applied for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground
that he should have been granted another lawyer
for his appeal. The Supreme Court held that the
no-merit letter which was submitted to the court
was not sufficient to satisfy the defendant's right
to assistance of counsel and equal protection as
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.
The Court stated that in order for the indigent
to receive equal protection under the law his ap-
pointed counsel must act as an advocate rather
than as anzicus curiae. A letter stating that there is
no merit in the case without any proof that the
appeal is frivolous does not satisfy this require-
ment. A rich man enjoys the benefit of counsel's
examination into the record, research of law, and
marshalling of arguments on his behalf. Thus when
the indigent's counsel merely determines that there
is no merit in the case the defendant has not been
granted equal protection.
The Court outlined a procedure which it con-
sidered to be commensurate with constitutional
guarantees. The lawyer must support his client's
appeal to the best of his ability. If he finds the case
to be "wholly frivolous", he should so advise the
court and request permission to withdraw. That
request should be accompanied by a brief referring
to anything in the record that might arguably sup-
port that appeal. The court, not counsel, then
proceeds to decide, after a full examination of all
the proceedings, whether the appeal is frivolous.
If it so finds then it can grant counsel's request to
withdraw and dismiss the appeal but if it does not
find it to be frivolous, it must afford the indigent
assistance of counsel by appointing another attor-
ney.
This requirement would afford the indigent "that
advocacy which the nonindigent is able to obtain.
... The no-merit letter affords neither the court
nor the client any aid.... The latter must shift
entirely for himself while the court has only the
cold record which it must review without the help
of an advocate." Finally, the Court states that this
procedure would "assure penniless defendants the
same rights and opportunities as are enjoyed by
those persons who are in a similar situation but who
are able to afford the retention of private counsel."
Roth Test No Longer Determinative-Redrup v.
New York, 87 S.Ct. 1414. In a per curiam opinion
reversing three convictions for the distribution
of obscene literature, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that for other than "hard core" pornog-
raphy the Roth test no longer controls as to the
question of the state's power to suppress distribu-
tion of books and magazines. The Court stated
that whichever of the various standards which the
Justices have adhered to for the determination of
obscenity is applied, the convictions could not
stand. The Court felt that it was significant that "in
none of the cases was there a claim that the stat-
ute in question reflected a specific and limited state
concern for juveniles", nor was there "any sugges-
tion of an assault upon individual privacy by pub-
lication in a manner so obtrusive as to make it
impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid
exposure to it", and finally "in none was there
evidence of any sort of pandering". In the absence
of any of the above factors the Court did not deem
it necessary to go into the question of whether the
material itself measured up to the standards which
it had used in the past. Instead of such an individ-
ual examination the Court stated that the cases
"can and should be decided upon a common and
controlling fundamental constitutional basis".
This case indicates that such a basis is one which
considers the circumstances surrounding publica-
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tion and distribution and the intent of a state to
protect its citizens rather than one which looks at
the material in a societal void.
Post-indictment Lineup And Right To Counsel-
United States v. Wade, 87 S.Ct. 1926 (1967). The
petitioner was convicted of bank robbery. During
the trial eye witnesses identified the defendant as
the robber. The petitioner claims that such evi-
dence should have been excluded because he was
exhibited to the witnesses before trial at a post-
indictment lineup without notice to, and in the
absence of counsel. The Court vacated the reversal
by the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to
the District Court.
Petitioner's Fifth Amendment contention was
rejected by the Court, citing Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Schmerber's holding
that compelling one to exhibit his person or to
provide a blood, handwriting, or other such sample,
does not violate the Fifth Amendment was reiter-
ated. The Court held again that the Fifth Amend-
ment protects one only against testimonial compul-
sion.
The Court concluded that a police lineup was a
critical stage of prosecution at which defendants
are entitled to the aid of counsel, as much as at the
trial itself. Thus, both the defendant and his at-
torney should have been notified of the impending
lineup; and his counsel's presence should have been
requisite to conduct of the lineup, in the absence
of intelligent waiver.
In so ruling the Court distinguished a lineup
from systematized or scientific analyses of finger-
prints, blood samples, clothing and the like. The
Court said that the latter categories are not critical
stages of prosecution because the attorney can do
nothing to help avoid substantial prejudice to
defendant's rights by being present. Lineups, on
the other hand, provide opportunities for such
prejudice which an attorney could possibly pre-
vent. There are many overt or covert means of
suggestion whereby police can influence a witness's
identification (one of those means cited by the
Court was the practice of requiring only the de-
fendant to wear distinctive clothing allegedly worn
by the culprit).
Since the defendant is unable to effectively
"reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred
at the lineup", the presence of counsel is essential
to protect his rights. However, in remanding the
case the Court stated that absence of counsel may
not require reversal if the Government can "estab-
blish by clear and convincing evidence that the
in-court identifications were based upon observa-
tions... other than the lineup identification".
Thus the conviction would be upheld if upon
remand the Government could show that the
in-court identification was not tainted by the
"illegal" lineup, or that if it was, the introduction
of the evidence was harmless error.
Illegal Lineup-Gilbert v. California, 87 S.Ct.
1951 (1967). The defendant was convicted of
armed robbery and murder. Subsequent to his
arrest handwriting samples were taken, and he was
placed in a lineup conducted without notice to his
counsel.
The Court ruled that the taking of handwriting
samples did not violate petitioner's Fifth or Sixth
Amendment rights. Citing Schmerber v. Calfornia,
384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court held that such
samples, in contrast to the content of what is
written, are identifying physical characteristics
outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment.
The Court also held that the taking of the samples
was not a "critical stage of the criminal proceedings
entitling petitioner to the assistance of counsel"
since there was minimal risk that absence of coun-
sel might derogate his right to a fair trial.
The California Supreme Court's ruling that
admission during trial of the accomplice's state-
ment to the police referring to the petitioner and
his part in the crime was harmless error was
affirmed by this Court. Certiorari on the issue of an
illegal search and seizure was vacated as improvi-
dently granted because of the lack of sufficient
facts on the record to decide that question.
The Court, relying on United States v. Wade,
87 S.Ct. 1926 (1967), which held that admission of
in-court identification of the petitioner was error
because it was not first determined whether they
were tainted by the illegal lineup. As in Wade, this
case was remanded for such a determination. The
conviction would be vacated if, on remand, it is
found that the identifications were so tainted.
As to the admission of testimony of witnesses
that they had identified petitioner at the illegal
lineup, however, the Court applied a per se exclu-
sionary rule. Such testimony is the direct result of
the illegal lineup, and therefore necessarily tainted
by it. While the in-court identification may be of
independent origin from that lineup, the testimony
that an identification was made at that lineup
cannot be. As such it must be held always inad-
missible. Since there was a possibility that the
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admission of this testimony might be harmless
error, the case was remanded on this point to give
the California Supreme Court an opportunity to
lecide if it was harmless "beyond a reasonable
doubt".
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion
in which he stated that he disagreed with the
Court with respect to the ruling on the handwriting
samples, and would remand for a new trial on the
search and seizure point. He felt there were suffi-
cient facts to show the illegality of the search. He
said that the docrine of "hot pursuit" relied on by
the California Supreme Court to justify the search,
was not applicable here because the officers con-
tinued the search after discovering that the
petitioner was not at home. In his view, this was
merely a search for evidence to link the petitioner
with the robbery and was not conducted to ex-
pedite the pursuit.
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in part, stated
that he would reverse because the taking of the
handwriting samples violated petitioner's Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights. He also disagreed
with the Court's exclusion of the in-court identifi-
cation and with the rationale of this case and of
Wade. Mr. Justice Fortas and Chief Justice Warren
also dissented in part on the ground that the taking
of handwriting samples violates Fifth and Sixth
Amendment privileges.
Wade and Gilbert Rules Requiring Exclusion
Of Identification Evidence Not Retroactive-
Storall '. Denno, 87 S.Ct. 1967 (1967). Petitioner
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
He then sought federal habeas corpus, claiming
that the admission of a witness's identification
testimony violated his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed,
and the Court of Appeals en bane affirmed. The
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that
the rulings in Uinited States v. Wade, 87 S.Ct. 1926
(1967); and Gilbert v. California, 87 S.Ct. 1951
(1967) are not to be applied retroactively.
Petitioner was handcuffed to one of five police
officers and brought to the hospital room where
the identifying witness was recovering from stab
wounds inflicted by the assailant who killed her
husband. He was the only Negro in the room, and
was identified as the man who committed the
offences.
The Court held that the rules requiring the
exclusion of identification evidence tainted by the
exhibiting of the accused before trial in absence of
counsel would not be applied retroactively so as to
vacate this conviction or others entered prior to
the new rulings.
The Court also held that the petitioner was not
deprived of due process by virtue of the fact that
he was brought to the hospital room for identifica-
tion. The Court recognized that under some cir-
cumstances, such a confrontation might be so
"unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to ir-
reparable mistaken identification" as to violate
due process. However, the totality of circumstances
in this instance did not present such a case.
Mr. Justice Black dissented, stating that if the
identification was not harmless error, the peti-
tioner was denied his right to counsel, and the
conviction should thereby be reversed.
Electronic Eavesdropping And The Fourth
Amendment-Berger v. New York, 87 S.Ct. 1873
(1967). Petitioner was convicted on two counts of
conspiracy to bribe a public official attached to the
.New York State Liquor Authority. Much of the
evidence adduced at his trial consisted of state-
ments made by the petitioner or others and inter-
cepted by the police through use of an electronic
eavesdropping device and a recording device.
These were installed pursuant to a New York
statute providing for the issuance of an ex parte
order by a judge, permitting the use of such de-
vices.
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of
this statute and the Court held that the statute
was too broad in its sweep, "resulting in a tres-
passory intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area and is, therefore, violative of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The New York statule
provided, inter alia, that upon oath or affirmation
by certain named categories of people a judge may
issue an ex parte order for eavesdropping. T':e
affidavit must state that there is reasonable
ground to believe that evidence of a crime may
thus be obtained, and it must particularly describe
the person(s) whose communications or conversa-
tions are to be overheard, including an identifying
telephone or telegraph line number. The order must
specify the duration of the use of the device, to
last not more than 60 days unless extended.
In pointing out that this statute permits general
searches by electronic devices, and was thus too
broad to fulfill the requirements of particularity of
the Fourth Amendment, the Court pointed out
seven basic defects to be found in the statute.
They are: (1) there is no requirement that the
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affidavit state any particular offense which it is
believed has been or will be committed; (2) no
requirement that the conversations to be used be
particularly described other than whose phone is
to be tapped; (3) the authorization of use for two
months at a time is equivalent to a series of intru-
sions, searches and seizures pursuant to a single
showing of probable cause; (4) the statute permits
extensions of the original two-month period on a
mere showing that the extension is " 'in the public
interest'" without a showing of present probable
cause; (5) the statute places no termination date
on the eavesdrop once the conversation sought is
obtained; (6) there is no requirement of notice, as
is found in conventional warrants, and no require-
ment of showing exigent circumstances to overcome
the need for notice; and (7) the statute does not
provide for the return of the warrant, thereby
"leaving full discretion in the officer as to the use
of seized conversations of innocent as well as guilty
parties." In summary, the Court stated that "the
statute's blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop
is without adequate judicial supervision or protec-
tive procedures".
Mr. Justice Black dissented on two grounds.
First, he believes that the Fourth Amendment
should not be interpreted to include in its prohibi-
tion the use of eavesdropping or recording devices.
In his view, the Amendment is only so extended by
reading into it a right of privacy which he feels is
not there to be found. Second, even if the "search"
here conducted is governed by the Fourth Amend-
ment, the circumstances surrounding this particu-
lar warrant were clearly sufficient to meet the
particularity requirement. He agreed with Justice
White that the Court erred in determining the
validity of the statute on its face without reference
to the specific case at bar.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, also on two
grounds. First, the constitutionality of the statute
should be determined in light of the construction
given it and limitations placed upon it by the New
York State Courts. This, says Harlan was not done
by the majority in this case. Second, like Mr.
Justice Black, Harlan believes the circumstances
presented by this case under this particular
statute do not show a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Use Of Secret Tape Recording Of Incriminating
Statements As Evidence-Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323 (1966). Osborn was convicted of
endeavoring to bribe a member of the jury panel
in the prospective criminal trial of James Hoffa.
Osborn, one of the attorneys for Hoffa, had con-
tacted Robert Vick of the Nashville Police De-
partment to make background investigations of
those listed on the jury panel. Vick, however, had
previously agreed to report any "'illegal activi-
ties'" to federal agents.
Osborn subsequently asked Vick to offer a bribe
to one Ralph Elliott to induce him to vote for an
acquittal. A tape recording of one of the conversa-
tions between Osborn and Vick, made by means of
a device hidden on the latter's person, was intro-
duced at trial over Osborn's objection.
The Court rested its rejection of Osborn's
contention that the tape recording should have
been excluded on two grounds. The first, or broad
ground, is that this case falls under the holding in
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), that
"use by one party of a device to make an accurate
record of a conversation about which that party
later testified," and subsequent use of that record-
ing as evidence, violates no constitutional right of
the defendant. Such use of recording devices is to
be distinguished from "surreptitious surveillance
of a private conversation by an outsider" as was
found in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1960).
The second, or narrower ground, is that the use
of the recording device in the instant case met the
"'requirements of particularity' which the dissent-
ing opinion in Lopez found necessary". Im-
mediately after the possibility of approaching
Elliott was first discussed, Vick reported the
conversation to a federal agent. This report was
then put in the form of an affidavit and shown to
two judges of the Federal District Court. The
judges then authorized the use of the recording
device to determine the truthfulness of the accusa-
tions contained in the affidavit. Because of this
"judicial authorization" the Court concluded that
the device was used "under the most precise,
discriminate circumstances" such as to satisfy the
strictest requirements in the protection of con-
stitutional rights.
Petitioner also raised the issue of entrapment,
claiming that according to his version of the facts,
it was Vick who first suggested the bribe, and that
he, Osborn, acquiesced in the scheme only "out of
weakness." However, the Court held that it was
for the jury to resolve this factual dispute, and
affirmed the conviction.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground
that use of this hidden recording device violated
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petitioner's right of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.
Use Of Government Informer To Obtain In-
criminating Statements From Defendant-lloffa
v. Unilcd States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Hoffa and
others were convicted of attempting to bribe mem-
bers of a jury in a trial of Hoffa for violation of the
Taft-Hartley Act. A significant portion of the
Government's proof consisted of testimony of one
Edward Partin, a Teamster's Union official from
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, who overheard in-
criminating statements made by Hoffa and
reported them to federal agents. The Court
resolved a preliminary conflict of whether or not
Partin was "planted" by the Government by ruling
it was immaterial, inasmuch as he was a paid
informer at least from the time he entered Hoffa's
Nashville hotel suite.
Petitioner contended that Partin's failure to
disclose his role as a government informer "vitiated
the consent that the petitioner gave to Partin's
repeated entries into the suite, and that by listening
to the petitioner's statements Partin conducted an
illegal 'search' for verbal evidence". Hoffa further
contended that use of this evidence at trial violated
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
The Court ruled, however, that the Fourth
Amendment protects only the "security a man
relies upon when he places himself or his property
within a constitutionally protected area;" and
that the petitioner herein was not relying upon
the security of his hotel suite, but "upon his
misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal
his wrongdoing." As such his Fourth Amendment
claim was spurious.
As for Hoffa's Fifth Amendment claim, the
Court said simply that Hoffa was not compelled to
say anything. Lacking compulsion, the Fifth
Amendment cannot apply, regardless of how
incriminating the statement may be.
Petitioner's Sixth Amendment contention
divided itself into two separate claims. The first
was that Partin's intrusion upon the confidential
relationship of attorney and client violated the
privilege. The Court answered this by saying even
if there was an intrusion, it could only result in the
reversal of conviction in the first trial. Such an
intrusion in no way related to or tainted evidence
brought out in the second trial based on a totally
different charge. The intrusion into this con-
fidential relationship affected only the matters
discussed between petitioner and his attorney-the
defense to be raised at the first trial. It could in no
way work to invalidate other, wholly unrelated
evidence.
The second contention was that since the
Government had sufficient grounds to arrest
Hoffa on October 25, 1962, which arrest would
have given him a right to the presence of counsel,
any statements made after that date are inadmissi-
ble as acquired only by flouting that privilege. In
rejecting this contention, the Court said: "There
is no constitutional right to be arrested. The
police are not required to guess at their peril the
precise moment at which they have probable
cause to arrest a suspect, risking violation of the
Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a
violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too
long."
Mr. Chief Justice Warren dissented on the
ground that a conviction should not be allowed to
stand where, as here, the Government "reaches
into the jailhouse to employ a man who was him-
self facing indictments far more serious ... for the
purpose of infiltration to see if crimes would in the
future be committed". This, according to the
Chief Justice is especially so when the reducing of
bail and dismissal of indictments against him
provide the witness with a strong motive for lying.
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Douglas
would dismiss because the writs of certiorari were
improvidently granted.
Disbarment For Refusal To Testify Or To
Produce Records At Disciplinary Proceeding
Illegal-Sp-ack v. Klein, 87 S.Ct. 625 (1967). The
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court ordered petitioner disbarred when he refused
to honor a subpoena duces lecum ordering him to
produce demanded records and testify in a proceed-
ing investigating charges of professional mis-
conduct brought against him. Petitioner's sole
defense was that such records and testimony would
tend to incriminate him. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the order of disbarment, and the Supreme
Court reversed.
Mr. Justice Douglas announced the judgment
of the Court and delivered an opinion in which
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black and Mr.
Justice Brennan concurred. Mr. Justice Douglas
pointed out that Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 116
(1961), a case practically on all fours with the
present case, would have to be overruled since
_Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), had held
that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
1967]
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Amendment was applicable to the states by reason
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus the states
could exact no penalty which made the exertion of
the right to remain silent "costly". In his own
words:
And so the question emerges whether the
principle of Mallory v. Hogan is inapplicable
because petitioner is a member of the Bar.
We conclude that Cohen v. Hurley should be
overruled, that the Self-Incrimination Clause
of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed
in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protec-
tion to lawyers as well as to other individuals,
and that it should not be watered down by
imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the
deprivation of a livelihood as a price for assert-
ing it. (87 S.Ct. at 627).
Even though Mr. Justice Douglas explicitly
stated that the question of whether a policeman
who invokes the privilege when his official conduct
is questioned can properly be discharged was not
before the court, Mr. Justice Fortas evidently felt
that the language of that opinion was so broad as
to have answered that question in the negative.
He therefore, wrote a concurring opinion in which
he stated:
But I would distinguish between a lawyer's
right to remain silent and that of a public
employee who is asked questions specifically,
directly and narrowly relating to the per-
formance of his official duties.... This court
has never held, for example, that a policeman
may not be discharged for refusal in discipli-
nary proceedings to testify as to his own con-
duct as a police officer.
But a lawyer is not an employee of the State.
He does not have to account to the State for
his actions because he does not perform them
as an agent for the State.... The special
responsibilities that he assumes as licensee of
the State and officer of the court do not carry
with them a diminution, however limited, of
his Fifth Amendment rights. Accordingly, I
agree that Spevack could not be disbarred for
asserting his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. (87 S.Ct. at 630-631).
Mr. Justice Harlan entered a dissenting opinion
in which Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice
Clark concurred. The most persuasive point
therein was the argument, unrebutted by the
plurality, that the present holding was inconsistent
with the rule, previously announced by the Court,
that it is permissible to deny a status or authority
to a claimant of the privilege if his claim has pre-
vented full assessment of his qualifications for that
status or authority.
Finally, Mr. Justice White, in a separate dis-
sent, argued that the rule in Garrity so protects
the Fifth Amendment rights that the rule of the
present case has no legal or practical basis. In his
own words:
However that may be, with Garrity on the
books, the Court compounds its error in Spe-
rack -e. Klein.... The petitioner in that case
refused to testify and to produce any of his
records. He incriminated himself in no way
whatsoever. The Court nevertheless holds that
he may not be disbarred for his refusal to do so.
Such a rule would seem justifiable only on the
grounds that it is an essential measure to pro-
tect against self-incrimination-to prevent
what may well he a successful attempt to
elicit incriminating admissions. But Garrity
excludes such statements, and their" fruits,
from a criminal proceeding and therefore frus-
trates in advance any effort to compel admis-
sions which could be used to obtain a criminal
conviction. I therefore see little legal or practi-
cal basis in terms of the privilege against self-
incrimination protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment, for preventing the discharge of a public
employee or the disbarment of a lawyer who
refuses to talk about the performance of his
public duty. (87 S.Ct. at 636--o37).
The Use Of Perjured Testimony And The Sup-
pression Of Evidence By The Prosecution-Giles
v. M1aryland, 87 S.Ct. 793 (1967). The defendants
were convicted of rape by a Maryland court. They
then brought an appeal under the Maryland Post-
Conviction Procedure Act, contending that they
had been denied Due Process, since the prosecu-
tion suppressed evidence favorable to them and
knowingly used perjured testimony against them.
The trial court agreed with the petitioners as to
the first ground, but ruled against them on the
second claim-a new trial was ordered. The Mary-
land Court of Appeals reversed the lower court,
and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the
Maryland Court of Appeals' judgement and re-
manded the case to allow the state court of last
resort an opportunity to decide if further hearings
should be directed. The suppressed evidence con-
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sisted of, firstly, an attempted suicide by the prose-
cutrix after she had had sexual relations with two
men at a party five weeks after the alleged rape.
At the hospital the girl claimed she had been
raped, but recanted her story and admitted to
numerous sexual indiscretions within the last
two years. Secondly, the prosecutrix had, one
month prior to the alleged rape, been recommended
for probation in a juvenile court proceeding, be-
cause she was beyond parental control. Lastly,
while the present case was pending, the girl was
sent to the Montrose School for Girls to protect
her from the boys in her locale, who were "har-
rassing" her. The juvenile court, however, also
found she should be confined because she was "out
of parental control and living in circumstances
endangering her wellbeing."
The United States Supreme Court was very
impressed with the fact that the credibility of the
witnesses is vastly important in cases of this ilk.
The Maryland Court of Appeals felt the suppres-
sion of the evidence did not constitute a denial of
Due Process since, if admitted, it would not tend
to clear the accused. Justice Brennan, writing the
majority opinion, framed the issues involved in
this appeal as follows: "whether the prosecution's
constitutional duty to disclose extends to all evi-
dence admissible and useful to the defense, and
the degree of prejudice which must be shown to
make necessary a new trial". But, the Court re-
fused to reach these questions because, on evidence
which was not part of the record, the Court found
that the prosecution had allowed false evidence to
go uncorrected in the record. The evidence only
went to the credibility of the prosecutrix. This
failure on the part of the state is grounds for re-
versal under the Fourteenth Amendment, said the
Court.
The evidence involved consisted of a police re-
port which reflected the results of interviews with
the girl and a witness the morning following the
alleged rape. In the post-conviction hearing the
trial judge refused the defense's motion that the
report be produced, on the ground that it was a
police work product and not producible under
state practice rules. The report showed that the
prosecutrix was engaged in intercourse with the
witness shortly before the defendants appeared on
the scene and allegedly raped the girl. At the trial
the testimony of the girl and the witness was in
direct contravention to the report.
Justice Brennan noted that this report could
have been used to impeach the credibility of the
witness and the prosecutrix. The report also in-
dicated the prosecutrix stated that she had not
had intercourse with Giles; her testimony was to
the opposite.
The opinion stated that since this "superven-
ing matter" had come into the case, it would follow
its usual practice of remanding to allow the state
court to decide if this new evidence was sufficient
to support a finding of prejudice.
Justice White concurred, but felt the report's
content as to the activities of the girl and the wit-
ness on the night in question could be suppressed.
The ground upon which he concurred was that he
felt the mental condition of the prosecutrix had
not been sufficiently probed by the trial court.
And the lack of testimony in this area was not the
fault of the accused. The learned Justice then
launched into various sections of the record to
demonstrate this point.
Justice Fortas concurred due to the failure of
the state to disclose to defense counsel the at-
tempted suicide and the dropped rape claim. In
effect, he concurred with the holding of the trial
judge at the post-conviction hearing. He disagreed
with the Maryland Court of Appeals contention
that the state need not disclose that which would
not be admissible at trial, since the state's duty is
to see that the truth emerges.
The state's duty is limited, to data that is "spe-
cific, factual, and concrete, although its implica-
tions may be debatable." The information in this
case bore upon the issue of consent, and Due
Process required its disclosure. Deliberate con-
cealment and nondisclosure are indistinguishable
from misrepresentation on principle, says this
opinion. Then the opinion launches into a discus-
sion on how this point differs from the dissent's
position; which is that the state must not know-
ingly use perjured testimony or leave it uncor-
rected. The latter proposition the opinion dis-
cards on the theory that the purpose of a trial is to
ascertain the truth and arrive at a just result.
Such a policy requires the state disclose material
evidence that can help the defense. "A murder
trial... is not a sporting event."
Justice Harlan, with whom Justices Black,
Clark and Stewart joined, dissented. In the main
the dissent says the majority and Justice White's
concurring opinion can find no federal basis for
returning the case to the state court.
The majority opinion, notes Justice Harlan, is
specious, since the police report was available to
the defense during trial, and inspected by the trial
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judge at the time of sentencing. The dissent then
goes on to explain why the prosecutrix had, mis-
takenly stated in the interview that the defendant
had not raped her. Another point the dissent makes
is the other police reports contravene the report
that is the center of this controversy. Lastly, the
state of Maryland does not allow evidence of prior
acts of intercourse to impeach the prosecutrix,
hence this part of the report would be inadmissible
in any event.
The dissent states that Justice W, hite does not
have any federal ground for his decision, but
merely feels that the trial judge failed to get
enough data concerning the mental state of the
prosecutrix. This feeling, claims the dissent, is not
sustained by the record.
Justice Fortas's position, says Justice Harlan,
is as objectionable as are the others, for reasons
noted in the discussion of Justice Fortas's concur-
rance. At base, Justice Harlan is a proponent of
narrow discovery rules, at least until there is more
study in the area.
The post-trial indications of promiscuity of the
prosecutrix has influenced the majority even
though it could find no constitittional breach, to re-
turn the case to the state court in the hope that
they will also be discomfited and will "discover a
formula under which these convictions can be re-
versed."
Search Of Home By Fraud and Deception
Permissible-Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206
(1966). Lewis was convicted on two counts of vi-
olating the narcotics laws 26 U.S.C. § 4742(a). At
his trial, marijuana purchased from him by an
undercover narcotics agent was introduced, along
with testimony of statements made by the de-
fendant to the agent. The defendant claims that
such evidence is inadmissible because procurred
through a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.
On two separate occasions, undercover agent
Cass telephoned Lewis, identified himself as
"Jimmy the Polack," and stated that he wished
to purchase some marijuana. On both occasions
Lewis told the agent to come to his apartment
where the purchase was to be made.
Petitioner contends that in the absence of a
warrant "any official intrusion upon the privacy of
a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation
and that the fact the suspect invited the intrusion
cannot be held a waiver when the invitation was
induced by fraud and deception".
In rejecting this contention and affirming the
conviction, the Court stated that there was no
violation of petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights
inasmuch as the agent was invited onto the prem-
ises for the purpose of consummating an illegal
sale of marijuana. The Court distinguished this
case from those such as Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921)-relied upon by petitioner-
where, after gaining entry by means of a fraudu-
lently obtained invitation, agents proceeded to
conduct a warrantless search. In the instant case
the agent did not "see, hear, or take anything
that was not contemplated, and in fact intended,
by petitioner as a necessary part of his illegal
business."
The Court made clear that as long as the agents
do not use deception in order to gain entry for the
purpose of conducting a search or overhearing
conversations, such deceptions would not be
"constitutionally prohibited". To hold otherwise,
said the Court, would result in a rule "that the
use of undercover agents in any manner is virtually
unconstitutional per se;" and such a rule would
undully hamper the Government in its combat of
organized crime.
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Fortas
concurred on the sole ground that petitioner's
apartment was not a constitutionally protected
area since he opened it up to the public for the
transaction of business.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground
that agent Cass's use of deception to gain entrance
to petitioner's home violated petitioner's right of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
Warrantless Searches By Municipal Health
And Safety Inspectors Unconstitutional-Camara
v. Municipal Court, 87 S.Ct. 1727(1967); See v.
Seattle, 87 S.Ct. 1737 (1967). In Camara, defendant
was arrested on a charge of violating the San
Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a
warrantless search of his residence by city health
officers. The facts showed that a San Francisco
housing inspector was making a routine inspec-
tion of an apartment building for possible code
violations. He was informed by the manager
that the defendant, the lessee of the first floor, was
using part of the premises as a personal residence
in violation of the Housing Code. When the in-
spector sought to enter the premises, however,
defendant refused to let him in since he could not
produce a warrant. This again occurred on two
other occasions even though defendant was in-
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formed that the inspection was required by law.
Defendant was arrested and, while awaiting trial,
he sought a writ of prohibition from the Cali-
fornia Superior Court, contending that the section
of the Muncipal Code allowing for warrantless
searches is contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The writ was denied by the state
courts, but this was reversed by the Supreme Court,
which overruled its prior decision in Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360(1959).
The Court found that the basic purpose of the
Fourth Amendment "is to safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary in-
vasion by governmental officials". This interest is
not met (except in certain "emergency situations"
where there is no time to obtain a warrant) unless
a warrant is issued upon a showing of probable
cause. This is true whether the search is of a
criminal nature, as where the police are looking
for contraband, or of a civil nature, where health
officials are seeking Code violators. "... . even the
most law-abiding citizen has a very tangible in-
terest in limiting the circumstances under which
the sanctity of his home may be broken by official
authority, for the possibility of criminal entry
under the guise of official sanction is a serious
threat to personal and family security." The rea-
soning in Frank, which found a distinction be-
tween this type of situation and a "criminal"
search, was fallacious in that any code violation
could result in criminal prosecution. Furthermore,
a search warrant would give the home owner the
added security of knowing whether the inspection
is authorized by law, what the limits of the search
are, and whether the inspector himself has the
power to search. This, the Court felt, would in-
sert a disinterested judicial officer into the picture
to determine whether the search is really needed.
The majority held, secondly, that, although a
warrant was required in these circumstances, it
need not be issued only upon a showing of probable
cause as to each particular dwelling. It is sufficient
if after an appraisal of the area as a whole, certain
minimum conditions are found to exist. The rea-
sons for this are: first, this would be the only ac-
ceptable means of achieving the desired results;
and, second, this results in a minimum invasion
into the privacy of the individual. "Probable
cause" for an area search, the court concluded
exists where certain administrative or legislative
standards for the inspection are satisfied. These
standards include, the nature of the buildings;
condition of the area, etc.
In See the defendant, a commercial warehouse
owner, was convicted for refusing to allow a repre-
sentative of the Seattle Fire Department to in-
spect his warehouse without a warrant. The only
question presented on appeal was whether the de-
cision in Camara was applicable here. The court,
in holding the search unconstitutional, felt that
there was no distinction between a warrantless.
search of commercial property or a residence..
"The businessman, like the occupant of a resi-
dence, has a constitutional right to go about hi-
business free from unreasonable official entries
upon his private commercial property."
justice Clark was joined by Justices Harlan and
Stewart in a dissenting opinion applicable to
both Camara and See. They contended that, since,
the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreason-
able searches, there is an area where warrantless
entries of this type should be allowed. Here, dearly,
the searches were reasonable since there was no
indication that they were unauthorized, arbi-
trary or capricious. Further, the person who is the
subject of the search can find out the limits of the
search, if the person is authorized, or other ques-
tions he might have, by either asking the inspector
to display an identification card or calling his
supervisor. The dissenters also felt that this extra
burden imposed by the majority would greatly
hinder health and safety inspections whose im-
portance in our society can be easily documented.
Finally, it was argued that since the majority
still allowed for the authorization of area searches
by magistrates whose expertise in this field is
highly doubtful, the provision for warrants would
be no more than a rubber stamp.
Search Of Impounded Automobile One Week
After Arrest Is Permissible-Cooper v. California.
87 S.Ct. 788 (1967). Defendant was convicted of
selling heroin, the conviction resting in part upon
a piece of brown paper sack seized without a
warrant from a car impounded by the police when
they arrested the accused. On appeal, the de-
fendant contended that this search and seizure,
which occurred a week after the arrest, was not
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the conviction, finding no
federal constitutional error. "The meaning of the
Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case... searches of cars
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that are constantly movable may make the search
of a car without a warrant a reasonable one. ...."
The accused argued that the search was not
incident to an arrest, and hence was unreasonable.
The California Attorney General contended that
the California Code allowed the state to impound
an auto used to transport, sell or "facilitate the
possession of narcotics". Such an auto is impounded
so that it may be "held as evidence".
Justice Black, writing the majority opinion,
noted that the state statutes do not enter into
the Court's deliberation, since the Court deter-
mined that, within the facts and circumstances of
the case at bar, the search and seizure was reason-
able. Cars, which are constantly movable, may
make the search of a car without a warrant rea-
sonable albeit "the result might be the opposite in
a search of a fixed piece of property".
It is true that the search was not incident to an
arrest, but since the car was held as evidence of the
narcotics violation, under the dictates of Cali-
fornia law, the search was reasonable. To elaborate,
Justice Black said, the car was seized "because of
the crime for which they arrested petitioner."...
The Court stated,
their subsequent search of the car... was
closely related to the reason petitioner was
arrested, the reason his car had been im-
pounded, and the reason it was being re-
tained.... It is no answer to say that the
police could have obtained a search warrant,
for the relevant test is not whether it is rea-
sonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search was unreasonable.
Justice Douglas, with whom Chief Justice
Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice Fortas
joined, wrote the dissenting opinion. The first
point mentioned is that the state did not have
title to the car at the time of the search. Secondly,
the state statute did not authorize the search.
Thirdly, the search was not pursuant to a war-
rant. Justice Douglas then said, "and since it (the
search) was not incidental to petitioner's arrest,
it was illegal."
The dissent makes much of the fact that the
state statute did not give the state dominion over
the auto. Even more important to the dissent's
position is the fact that the search was not in-
cidental to the arrest. The dissent concludes that
the Bill of Rights applied through the Fourteenth
Amendment is applied differently by the majority
than if it were applied directly.
Comment: The bone of contention between the
majority and dissent is Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364 (1964). Although the majority distin-
guished the Prestan case, the dissent disagreed
and felt that the cases stood on all fours.
In the field of search and seizure, each case must
be decided on its own facts and circumstances,
and since the Supreme Court may determine which
facts are germane and which are insignificant, it
may always distinguish one case from another.
True, the general principles may be static, but the
Court has flexibility to do justice in each case.
Unfortunately, such an attitude makes it im-
possible, in many borderline cases, for a policeman
to determine whether or not he may make a valid
search. One might be tempted to say that such an
approach unduly hinders law enforcement, and
breeds a contemptuous attitude in the police for a
system wherein they can find no rules of a solid
nature.
Prior Conviction Admissible For Recidivist Act
Where Jury Properly Instructed-Spencer v.
Texas, 87 S.Ct. 648 (1967). Three cases argued
before the Supreme Court of the United States
brought into question the constitutionality of the
Texas recidivist procedure under which evidence
of prior convictions is admitted to the jury.
In No. 68 petitioner was indicted for murder
with malice of his common-law wife. The indict-
ment alleged that he had been previously con-
victed of murder. In No. 69 petitioner was in-
dicted for robbery, and the indictment alleged that
he had previously been convicted of bank rob-
bery. No. 70 involved a third-offender prosecution
for burglary which had been finally disposed of but
was attacked collaterally in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding. The recidivist statute in question, an en-
hancement statute, provided that prior convictions
should be alleged in the indictment and proved as
a matter of fact. The jury was instructed that proof
of prior conviction was to be considered only for
purposes of assessing the sentence to be imposed
and not to establish the defendant's guilt under
the current indictment.
In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court, per Mr.
Justice Harlan, ruled that any prejudice arising
from this procedure, when compared with the
state's interest in controlling recidivism, was not
sufficient to require reversal. The majority did not
applaud these proceedings-in fact they noted
with approval that Texas had since these convic-
tions amended its act to provide for a two step
process. However, they felt constrained to allow
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the state to devise its own rule of evidence as long
as such did not fall below the minimal level the
Fourteenth Amendment will tolerate.
State Harmless Error Rules And The Violation
Of A Federal Right-Chapman v. California, 87
S.Ct. 824 (1967). Defendants were convicted of
robbery, kidnapping and first degree murder. The
defendants refused to testify on their own behalf.
At the time of trial the state constitution allowed
the court, and counsel, to comment upon a failure
to explain evidence in the case against a defendant.
The constitution also allowed the jury to consider
the failure to testify and the ensuing comments. In
the case at bar the state and the court commented
upon the defendants' failure to testify, and the
jury was allowed to draw adverse inferences from
this failure to testify. Prior to this case's arrival
in the State Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court, in Griffin v. State, 380 U.S. 609
(1965), held the relevant clause of the State con-
stitution was unconstitutional, because the prac-
tice was a penalty on one's right not to be a witness
against himself.
In the case at bar, the California Supreme Court
held that the petitioners were denied their federal
constitutional rights, but the state constitution
forbade reversal for harmless errors, and the error
in this case was a harmless error.
The United States Supreme Court, on certiorari,
considered the questions; whether the violation of
the rule could be harmless, and whether the error
was in fact harmless. The Court reversed the con-
viction.
Justice Black, writing the majority opinion,
noted that when the violation of a federal right is
involved, the state will not be allowed to devise
rules to protect its people from violations of
federally created rights; the Federal Courts will
fashion the necessary norm. The opinion stated
that the harmless rule doctrine is constitutional,
albeit there are some constitutional rules whose
violation always is a "harnful" error. To be harm-
less in federal eyes, the court must be sure beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.
Upon a review of the record, the Court held that
the error was not harmless because the state did
not demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the court's instruction and the prosecutor's com-
ments did not contribute to the conviction of the
defendants.
Justice Stewart concurred, due to the fact that
he felt the harmless error doctrine is inapplicable
in questions of violations of constitutional rights,
or at least in the Griffin [Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, (1965)] situation.
Justice Harlan dissented, feeling the Court's
formulation of the harmless error standard is not
the only constitutional one, and that the Court
should not assume "what amounts to a general
supervisory power over the trial of federal consti-
tutional issues in state courts." The opinion then
goes into a discussion designed to prove that the
Court was given no such power by the constitu-
tion.
The opinion reviews the history of the Cali-
fornia rule, and the United States Supreme Court's
various formulations of the rule.
Justice Harlan then reviewed the evidence and
found the California formulation to be a reason-
able one, in the present case's circumstances.
Nolle Prosequi With Leave Violated Defend-
ant's Rights To Speedy Trial-Klo.fer v. North
Carolina, 87 S.Ct. 988 (1967). The defendant had
been charged with criminal trespass. At the trial,
the jury could not reach agreement and a mistrial
was granted. The trial judge continued the case
for the rest of the term. Some eight months later
the prosecutor asked for and got a further con-
tinuance. In August, 1965 about 18 months after
the initial trial, the defendant asked that the
status of his case be reviewed. The prosecutor
then asked for and was granted a nolle prosequi
with leave.
The Court characterizes the nolle prosequi with
leave as denying the defendant the opportunity to
exonerate himself for as long as the prosecutor sees
fit. North Carolina argued that while the case
could be reinstated the defendant was entirely
free to go "whithersoever he will." The Court re-
jected the contention that the pendancy of the
case had no affect by referring to possible adverse
public scorn, job insecurity (defendant was a
zoology professor), and general anxiety and con-
cern.
The Court did not apparently strike down the
entire procedure as unconstitutional in all cases
but only in the particular facts of the case did the
Court feel that the defendant was denied the right
to a speedy trial guaranteed under the Sixth
Amendment.
Commitment Proceedings Under Colorado Sex
Offenders Act Denies Due Process-Specht v.
Patterson, 87 S.Ct. 1209 (1967). The defendant was
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convicted for indecent liberties under a Colorado
Statute which carried a maximum sentence of ten
years, but he was not sentenced under it. Instead,
defendant was ordered confined under the Sex
Offenders Act (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §39-19-1 to
10 (1963)) for an indeterminate term of from one
day to life. The Act declares that the procedure
which must be followed is:
(1) A complete psychiatric examination shall
have been made of him (defendant) by the
psychiatrists of the Colorado psychopathic
hospital or by psychiatrists designated by
the district court and
(2) A complete written report thereof sub-
mitted to the district court. Such report
shall contain all facts and findings, to-
gether with recommendations as to
whether or not the person is treatable un-
der the provisions of this article; whether
or not the person should be committed to
the Colorado state hospital or to the
state home and training schools as men-
tally ill or mentally deficient. Such report
shall also contain the psychiatrist's opin-
ion as to whether or not the person could
be adequately supervised on probation.
This procedure was followed by the trial court.
Defendant appealed his confinement claiming
that this procedure did not satisfy due process
because it permitted the critical findings under (1)
of the Sex Offenders Act to be made without a
hearing at which the defendant could confront
and cross examine adverse witnesses and present
evidence of his own and because hearsay evidence
to which the defendant is not allowed access is
admitted.
The Supreme Court reversed the confinement
order holding that this procedure did not satisfy
due process because there was no right of con-
frontation, no right to cross examine and no right
for the defendant to present his own evidence.
No Deprivation Of Rights When Indigent Not
Advised Of Right To Court-appointed Counsel
On Appeal-Gairson v. Gladden, 425 P.2d 761
(Ore. 1967). On a petition for post-conviction re-
lief, defendant contended that he was denied his
constitutional rights since he was not advised of
his right to court appointed counsel on appeal.
The defendant, after being convicted of second
degree murder, advised his attorney that he had
no more funds for purposes of the appeal. Neither
the attorney, nor the court, advised the defendant
of his right to court appointed counsel. The Oregon
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not
have any duty to advise defendant of this right
and it denied the petition for post-conviction re-
lief.
The court admitted that under the Fourteenth
Amendment the defendant did have a right to
court appointed counsel [See Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963)] but it put the burden upon
the defendant to make a request for one. It rea-
soned that, "since the right to appeal is merely a
statutory right the assistance of counsel necessary
to implement that right can be of no greater
magnitude and does not rise to the level of a con-
stitutional right under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." It concluded that
"neither the court nor any agency of government
is required to inquire of a convicted defendant for
the purpose of determining whether he intends to
appeal and if so whether he has the means to em-
ploy counsel."
Comment: Since Gideon v. Wainright 372 U.S.
335 (1962), it has been a generally accepted rule
that an indigent must be advised of his right to a
court appointed counsel at trial. In Illinois this is
required by Rule 27 (6) of the Supreme Court
Rules. This is also required in Federal courts by
18 U.S.CA § 3006. Gideon, however, only required
that an indigent who asks for court appointed
counsel must be grated one. Since this right can
only be waived if there is an "intentional re-
linquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege" an individual must be advised of this
right so that he can intelligently choose whether or
not to make such a waiver. See Johnson v. Zerbst
304 U.S. 458 (1938). This logic can also be applied
to the situation in the present case. In Douglas, the
Supreme Court extended the right of court ap-
pointed counsel to an indigent for an appeal when
that appeal is granted to any citizen as a right.
The Court there based its opinion on the Four-
teenth Amendment, instead of the Sixth as it did
in Gideon, reasoning that it would be denying the
indigent equal protection if he was not provided
with counsel. The right of the indigent to appeal
would be meaningless if the poor as well as the
rich could not take advantage of it. The Oregon
court, however, uses this constitutional distinction
to deny an indigent this right. It is true that the
right to an appeal is granted by statute whereas the
right to an attorney at trial is granted by the
Sixth Amendment, but once the right to appeal is
given, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
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that each individual may avail himself of this
right. Furthermore, the right guaranteed in Gideon
is not waived merely because the defendant did
not ask for court appointed counsel. He could not
waive a right he did not know he had and thus he
should have been advised of this right. This be-
comes especially crucial today when an appeal has
become an integral part of the total process of de-
termining one's guilt. The individual with adequate
funds can hire a lawyer for his appeal but the in-
digent may not know that he has a right to court
appointed counsel for an appeal. All the guaran-
tees for a fair trial which the Supreme Court has
demanded in recent years would become meaning-
less if an individual is not granted those same
rights on appeal. Therefore, the Oregon Supreme
Court's decision seems inappropriate in an era
when the right of each defendant, rich or poor, to
a fair hearing has been so emphasized.
Required Language To Be Adequate Escobedo
Warning-Commonwealth v. Medina, 227 A.2d 842
(Penn. 1967). Defendant was convicted of second
degree murder. At trial, testimony of statements
made by defendant to the police in the absence of
counsel was admitted. Twice during the question-
ing the defendant was warned that he did not have
to say anything unless he wanted to.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction holding that the warnings
given by the police were insufficient in that the
police were under a duty to warn the defendant not
only that he did not have to say anything unless
he wanted to, but also that anything he said could
and would be used against him in court. This com-
plete warning is necessary no matter what the
background of the accused is in order to overcome
the pressures of in-custody interrogation and to
make the accused aware of his privilege and of the
consequences of foregoing it.
Tacit Admission Rule Violates Fifth Amend-
ment-Conzmonwealth v. Dravecz, 227 A.2d 904
(Penn. 1967). Defendant was employed as a laborer
by Ciasson Corporation which owned a trailer in
which were stored many items of construction
equipment. Much of this equipment disappeared
and part or all of it was found by the state police
on a farm owned by the defendant's parents. Sub-
sequently, the police questioned a foreman for
Caisson Corporation who gave the police a signed,
notarized statement that the defendant had come
to him with some of the missing equipment and
asked him to sell it. The defendant submitted to
questioning by the police and denied that he had
taken the tools. The police then brought the fore-
man before defendant and read the foreman's
statement. Defendant made no comment at the
end of the reading. At trial this written statement
was admitted under the tacit admission exception
to the hearsay rule. The defendant was convicted
of burglary and larceny and appealed, contending
that his Fifth Amendment right against self-in-
crimination had been violated.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed
the conviction holding that the tacit admission rule
was completely untenable. "A defendant is not
required to deny any accusation levelled at him at
trial no matter how inculpatory... No inference
of guilt may be drawn from his failure to reply"
to these charges. Yet under the tacit admission
rule, a third person may make an accusatory state-
ment at any place whatsoever and if the defendant
fails to answer then the third person's "unmoni-
tored, unauthenticated declaration may doom
him."
Corpus Delicti Must Be Proven Independent
Of A Confession-Conmmnweallh v. Leslie, 227
A.2d 900 (Pa. 1967). The defendant was con-
victed of arson. The evidence was that a fire had
destroyed a summer cottage. The state policeman
who investigated the fire found nothing to indicate
that the fire was caused intentionally, but he had a
"hunch" that it was not an accidental fire. The
defendant was subsequently arrested for other
crimes to which he confessed, these confessions
later being proved false. The defendant's descrip-
tion fit that of a person seen in the area of the fire
by two neighbors. Defendant confessed that he
started the fire, the police again investigated the
burned cottage and again could not uncover any
evidence to indicate that the fire was started de-
liberately.
In reversing the conviction, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the only direct evidence
of defendant's guilt was his confession. The court
agreed that the corpus delicti could always be
proven by circumstantial evidence, but held that
in the present case the State had failed to show
that the fire was a deliberate one. The court held
that the State's reliance on the confession alone
to prove the corpus delicti was insufficient, and
that the state must prove the commission of a
crime by evidence other than the confession. The
court noted that without this requirement an in-
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dividual could confess and be convicted when in
fact no crime had been committed.
Search Incident To Informal Detention Per-
miffed-State v. Huffman, 148 N.W.2d 321 (Neb.
1967). Defendant was convicted of breaking and
entering and sentenced to 15 years as a recidivist.
At the trial his motion to suppress certain bricks,
a rifle, and ammunition was denied and defendant
appealed contending that the search and seizure of
the items was unlawful.
The search had occurred when defendant's car
was stopped on the highway after it had been seen
at the scene of a breakin, and its description broad-
cast to other units. One of the officers shined a
flashlight into the window of the car and observed
the rifle and brick which the defendant reached into
the car and handed to the officer. The defendant
also took the ammunition out of the glove com-
partment and handed that to the officer.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the con-
viction by holding that ". . . informal detention is
permissible in spite of a lack of probable cause for
custody in the spirit of arrest". The court concluded
that since the detention was reasonable the search
that accompanied it was also reasonable.
Comment: While the conclusion of the court is
correct, their characterization of the detention as
having been made without probable cause is
strange. The defendant's car, a 1955 Buick, was
seen parked in front of the factory which was sub-
sequently found to have been robbed. The descrip-
tion of the car was broadcast on the radio and the
car was stopped by an officer who recognized it as
matching the description.
Search Of Car At Station Permissible-State v.
Anderson, 148 N.W.2d 414 (Iowa 1967). Defend-
ants were convicted of possession of burglary tools
and appealed on the grounds that the search of the
car and the seizure of the tools at the police station
was unlawful. The defendants, who were brothers,
were stopped by the police while driving around at
5 A.M. The police had been following them for
two hours after learning of a robbery which the
brothers were suspected of committing.
The police stopped the car and told the brothers
to get out. As they did so one of the brothers was
observed stuffing what appeared to be a gun under
the seat. The police looked under the seat and
found a pistol and also observed a rifle in the back.
The defendants were arrested for possession of con-
cealed weapons and taken to the station. One of
the officers drove the car to the station and opened
the trunk, ostensibly to search for more weapons,
and found the burglary tools.
The court, in a well-supported opinion, distin-
guished the search in this case from Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1959), which had over-
turned a search of a car while in police custody, on
the grounds that in the instant case the search at
the station was only a continuation of the search
on the road. The court noted that if the search had
been completed on the road it certainly would have
been permissible, and felt there was no reason why
the officers should not be able to complete the
search in the warmth and safety of the police
garage.
Disclosure Of Identity Of Informant On Issue
Of Probable Cause-State v. Jackson, 226 A.2d 804
(Conn. Cir. 1966); McCray v. State of Illinois, 87
S.Ct. 1056 (1967). In the Jackson case the defend-
ant was charged with the sale of alcoholic liquor
without a permit and keeping liquor with intent
to sell, a misdemeanor in violation of the Liquor
Control Act. The arresting officer received informa-
tion about the sale of alcoholic beverages by the
defendant from an informant. The officer gave the
informant money to purchase liquor from the de-
fendant and observed the informant go into the
defendant's apartment and come out with a bottle
of gin. The officer then went to the defendant's
apartment and placed the defendant under arrest.
After the arrest, when the officer asked the defend-
ant if he could search her apartment, she replied:
"Go ahead". A search was made which uncovered
a large quantity of alcoholic beverages. The defend-
ant moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the
search on the ground that the property was seized
without a warrant and that there was not probable
cause on which a warrant could be issued.
In denying the motion, the Circuit Court of Con-
necticut held that no warrant was required since
the search was incident to an arrest and the search
was reasonable since only specific items were being
sought and since the search was not "remote in
time and place from the arrest". The search, then,
would be valid if the arrest were a legal arrest,
made on probable cause. The defendant contended
that the prosecution must disclose the identity of
the informant to give the defendant a fair oppor-
tunity to rebut the officer's testimony on the issue
of probable cause for the arrest. The court held
that disclosure of the identity of the informant was
not required since reliability of the informant had
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been sufficiently established without disclosure by
the testimony of the arresting officer that the in-
formant had given him in the past "... informa-
tion which has resulted in arrests and convictions
[in] several liquor cases". The court treated the
issue of reliability "under the particular circum-
stances" as "... . left for the court to decide on a
weighing and balancing of conflicting interests".
In the McCray case the defendant was convicted
of unlawful possession of narcotics. The arrest was
made without a warrant on the basis of informa-
tion supplied the arresting officers by an informant,
who told the officers that the defendant had heroin
on his possession and pointed him out to the
officers. The officers stopped the defendant on the
street and searched him, discovering the heroin.
At a hearing on a motion to suppress the heroin as
evidence on the ground that the search was illegal
for want of probable cause, the two arresting
officers testified that they had known the inform-
ant for roughly one and two years respectively and
that during such periods the informant had sup-
plied accurate information which resulted in sev-
eral convictions. Both officers, when questioned as
to the informant's identity, refused to respond.
Objections to the questions were sustained and the
motion to suppress was denied.
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the con-
viction and certiorari was granted by the United
States Supreme Court. The petitioner claimed that
even though a finding of probable cause was fully
supported by the officers' sworn testimony, the
trial court violated the Due Process Clause and the
right to confrontation when it sustained the objec-
tions to questions concerning the informant's
identity. The Supreme Court affirmed, in a five to
four decision, holding in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Stewart that the identity of an informant need not
be disclosed when the issue is not guilt or innocence
but rather the question of probable cause for an
arrest or search, saying that ... nothing in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a state court judge in every such hearing
to assume the arresting officers are committing
perjury". As for the petitioner's claim that his
right to confrontation was violated, the Court held
that any contention that the prosecution must
produce the informant as a witness was "abso-
lutely devoid of merit".
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, in
which Chief Justice Warren, _Mr. Justice Brennan
and Mr. Justice Fortas concurred, stated that the
Court's decision left the Fourth Amendment
".... exclusively in the custody of the police" and
that without disclosure of the informant
".... neither we nor the lower courts can ever know
whether there was 'probable cause' for the arrest".
Informant's Information Sufficient For Probable
Cause-State t.. Lampson, 149 -N.W.2d 116 (Iowa
1967); Common.wealth v. Palladino, 226 A.2d 201
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). In the Lampson case the de-
fendant was convicted of breaking and entering.
Evidence used by the prosecution had been ob-
tained pursuant to the use of a search warrant. The
defendant, after entering a plea of not guilty, filed a
motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the
search on the ground that the search warrant was
issued without probable cause since it was obtained
on the strength of the police officer's affidavit based
solely upon information furnished by an informant
and not based on any personal knowledge of the
officer. The motion was overruled. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed, holding that
"... probable cause mentioned in the Constitution
and statute does not have to be shown in the infor-
mation itself, but may be shown in an affidavit
attached thereto, or by sworn testimony taken
before the magistrate prior to the issuance of the
warrant". In Lampson the police officer upon the
application for the warrant told the court of the
informant's reliability on several past occasions
and that he had personally dealt with the inform-
ant many times. The officer also told the judge in
much detail what was observed by the informant
which provided the basis for the officer's suspi-
cions.
In the Palladino case the defendant was con-
victed of bookmaking and maintaining a gambling
establishment. This conviction also resulted from
the introduction of evidence obtained in a search
pursuant to a search warrant issued on the applica-
tion of a police officer who attached an affidavit
which recited that the information presented for
the most part was supplied by an informant known
to be reliable and in part by the police officer's
own surveillance. A motion to suppress the evi-
dence resulting from the search was filed and after
hearing was denied. On appeal the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed. Judge Hoffman dissented
on the ground that the affidavit was insufficient
because it, unlike the situation in the Lampson
case, rested upon a "... bare assertion of the
informant's reliability" and failed to provide any
"underiying circumstances" [Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108. 114 (1964)] upon which was based the
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informant's information and conclusions or upon
which was based the police officer's conclusion
of the informant's reliability. The affidavit did
not state whether, or upon what circumstances,
the informant in the past furnished information,
and it did not state that the informant's informa-
tion was based upon personal knowledge. The
affiant, in fact, at the hearing on the motion to
suppress, admitted that his information was ob-
tained from another police officer who supposedly
dealt with the unnamed informant directly. Judge
Hoffman stated that ". . . the probability that this
affidavit rests on multiple hearsay, rooted in con-
jecture, is too great to be ignored". Judge Hoffman
found the officer's personal observations to be
without any value.
Local Standards Are To Be Used For Determin-
ing Whether A Live Production Is Obscene
-Newark v. Humphres, 228 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super.
1967). Defendants were convicted of violating a
city ordinance prohibiting a female performer from
removing her clothing so as to give an illusion of
nudeness or performing any dance, the purpose or
effect of which is to direct attention to the breast,
buttocks or genital organs of the performer. The
conviction was based upon testimony by police
investigators who had witnessed the performers,
that the defendants had performed the acts pro-
scribed by the ordinance. The court reversed the
convictions since it was not established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the dominant purpose of the
presentations was erotic allurement or that they
were so offensive as to warrant conviction.
The basic problem facing the court was how to
interpret the Roth [Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957)] test of "contemporary community
standards" for purposes of live performances. The
court pointed out that there are important differ-
ences between material which can be re-examined
in court and a live performance, "of which a
fleeting moment might have revealed an action or
illusion that went beyond propriety." First of all
a live performance is "of a vanishing quality, of no
permanency, incapable of continuous and succes-
sive transmission to other areas of the country in
exactly the same form and image from whence it
originated." Secondly, "a local theatre performance
cannot be foisted upon an unwilling public," as
may occur when publications are received in-
voluntarily through the mail. Therefore, the court
concluded that "in determining whether a live
production is obscene, lewd or indecent, the adop-
tion of local morality at the time and place of
exhibition, is the more realistic standard." The
court concluded that the performances of the
defendants were no more offensive than conduct
currently accepted in topless clubs and dance
cabarets in the modern metropolis and thus they
could not be considered contrary to contemporary
community standards.
Manner Of Presentation Relevant To A Deter-
mination Of Obscenity-Ferris v. Maryland State
Board of Censors, 226 A.2d 317 (Md. 1967). The
appellant had submitted to the Maryland Board
of Censors for approval a number of silent films
which were designed for showing in coin-operated
viewing devices in an amusement arcade in an
area of Baltimore City known as "the Block".
"The Block" contained several night-clubs, book
shops, a burlesque house, tatoo parlors and various
arcades. The films were viewed in a booth by a
single spectator who deposited a coin in a slot
which would release a portion of a film for viewing.
Each film submitted to the Board showed one or
more scantily-clad women, each writhing in various
poses, ".... clearly inviting and then simulating
sexual intercourse". The Board disapproved the
licensing of the films on the ground that they were
obscene.
In affirming the Board's action, the Circuit
Court of Baltimore City admitted evidence as to
the character of the neighborhood of "the Block".
The Board contended that the manner in which
the material is presented is relevant to a determina-
tion of obscenity under the test of Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
On appeal the Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed, holding that the manner of presentation,
in this case ". . . the viewing in a booth by a single
spectator, in the position of a peeping Tom, who
feeds his coins into the machine presumably in the
hope that he will be even more titillated by what
will come than by what has gone before", is
relevant in determining whether the films are an
appeal to prurient interest not only under Ginzburg
but also under the Roth [Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957)] test before Ginmburg. The Court
of Appeals did not ". . deem it necessary to
decide whether... the location of the booths
within the area of 'the Block' constitut[ed] 'pan-
dering' under the Ginzburg doctrine".
Confession Obtained While Intoxicated In-
admissable-Logner v. State, 260 F.Supp. 970
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(M.D.N.C. 1966). Defendant was arrested on a
charge of driving while intoxicated when he became
involved in a traffic accident obviously due to
over-indulgence which had been witnessed by
two police officers. While he was in the police car
be made the statement that he could pay for the
damage and that they knew where he got the
money, evidently referring to a number of recently
committed robberies with which he was linked.
When they arrived at the police station defendant
was interrogated on three different occasions,
during which he was informed of his constitutional
rights which he waived. During each session the
defendant was in a state of intoxication which was
recognized by the officers, but they continued to
question him. Each time certain incriminating
remarks were elicited which were the basis of a
later conviction for the robberies. Defendant
objected to the admission of the incriminating
statements since they were given when defendant
was without the aid of counsel and under the
influence of alcohol. Defendant was convicted of
the offenses and the Supreme Court of North
Carolina affirmed. On a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus the District Court reversed and
remanded.
The court decided, first, that defendant's con-
viction was based on an involuntary confession
and this deprived him of due process of law, re-
gardless of the truth or falsity of the confession
and even though defendant may have been guilty
of the crime. The coercive nature of the confession
was found in the fact that defendant was arrested
for drunken driving; that the investigating officer
found defendant too drunk to make a statement;
that others noted defendant was intoxicated and
had the appearance of being under the influence.
The decision went on to state that any confession
obtained from a person under the influence of
alcohol or drugs causes it to be inadmissable.
"The petitioner's will had been overborne by the
alcohol and drugs. Whether he had a false sense of
confidence,... or an acute sense of remorse, his
capacity for self-determination was critically
impaired, rendering any confession gained ob-
jectionable."
Finally, it was urged by the state that the state-
ments made by the defendant were voluntary
since he was warned of his constitutional right to
remain silent. This was rejected by the court,
since, clearly, defendant was incapable of intel-
ligently or knowingly waiving his constitutional
rights.
Miranda Not Applicable To Prosecutions Of
Minor Offenses-State v. Zitcconi, 226 A.2d 16
(N.J. Super. 1967). The defendant was convicted
of careless driving and fined one hundred dollars.
Whfile in a hospital recovering from injuries re-
ceived in the accident which led to the charge,
the defendant was questioned twice by a police
officer and signed a written statement in the pres-
ence of members of his family in which he admitted
that he had driven the car at the time of the acci-
dent. The statement was the state's only evidence
that the defendant had driven the car.
On appeal the defendant contended that the
statement should have been excluded under the
rules laid down in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). When he made the admission to the police
officer, the defendant had no counsel present and
had not been informed of his right to counsel or
his right to remain silent. The court held that
Miranda did not apply because the trial took place
before Miranda. The court, however, went on to
say that even if the trial had been after the
Miranda decision, the decision still would not
apply since the defendant "... was not under
arrest, in custody, or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities" at the time he made
his admission. Further, the court stated that
Miranda did not apply to motor vehicle violations,
which are not criminal. In discussing the inappli-
cability of M[iranda to "quasi-ciminal" offenses,
the court said that there are offenses "... of so
common and minor a nature that it would be
impractical and unnecessary to bring in the full
panoply of constitutional protections in dealing
with them".
The court considered the fines and terms of
imprisonment under the motor vehicle laws to be
"minor" in comparison to those fixed under the
criminal laws and that in most cases the defendant
can expect only "moderate" fines and not im-
prisonment. Noting that in the present case the
defendant was only fined and not imprisoned, the
court described a rule adopted by the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, which requires that a
defendant be informed of his right to counsel and
assigned counsel only where a sentence of imprison-
ment may be imposed, as creating a distinction
which "may be practical and have merit". The
court referred to the problems that would be
encountered if Miranda were to be applied "willy-
nilly" to all minor offenses, and it seemed to the
court that ". . the police practices described in
Miranda as reasons for the adoption of the rules
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therein laid down have no pertinence to motor
vehicle and similar minor cases".
Permissibility Of Jury View Up To The Discre-
tion Of The Trial Judge.-Battese v. State, 425
P.2d 606. (Alaska 1967). Defendant was convicted
of burglary and attempted larcency. The state
was permitted to show the jury the place where the
crime was committed before any evidence was
taken and before the state had established the
corpus delecti. In objecting, the defense contended
that a jury view was not proper at this stage of
the trial and also that there had been material
changes on the premises since the burglary had
taken place. The court, on appeal, affirmed the
trial court's decision to grant the jury view. It
stated that the stage at which a jury should be
permitted to view the premises is a matter within
the discretion of the trial court, and will be re-
viewed only for an abuse of discretion. It found no
such abuse here, since it made sense to the court to
allow the view before the evidence was taken so
that the jury could more readily understand the
evidence. As to the second contention, the court
stated that "a jury view of premises may be al-
lowed even if conditions have changed, if the
character of the change is properly brought out in
the evidence." Since photographs taken before
the material change in the premises were intro-
duced at the trial the court determined that this
condition had been met.
Right Of Defense Counsel To Interview Pros-
ecution's Witnesses-Gregory v. United 5tates
300 F.2d 185 (D.C.Cir. 1966). Defendant was
convicted of first and second degree murder,
robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. Defense
counsel and the prosecutor appeared before a
motions judge before the trial began at which the
defense counsel stated that two eye witnesses to
one of the crimes refused to talk with him unless
the prosecutor was present or authorized the
witnesses to talk with him. The motions judge
declined to take any action. At trial defense counsel
again asked for the judge's assistance to aid him
in interviewing these witnesses. The prosecutor
stated that he had told the witnesses they could
speak to anyone, but it was his advice that they
not speak to anyone about the case unless he was
present. The trial judge also refused to assist de-
fense counsel in talking with the witnesses.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed defendant's con-
viction. One of the grounds for reversal was that
even though the prosecutor only advised the
witnesses not to speak to anyone about the case
without him being present, this advice interfered
with the defense's effective preparation of the
case. Citing Canon 39 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics and Canon 10 of the Code of Trial Conduct
of the American College of Trial Lawyers, the
court held that since presumably the prosecutor
was unencumbered by defense counsel's presence
during his interview of the witnesses. "there seems
to be no reason why defense coundel should not
have an equal opportunity to determine, through
interviews with the witnesses, what they know
about the case and what they will testify to".
Evidence Obtained In Search Of Defendants'
Trucks Hours After Their Arrest Held Inadmis-
sible-Petty v. State, 411 S.W.2d 6 (Ark. 1967).
Defendants were convicted of burglary and grand
larceny for breaking and entering a bowling estab-
lishment and taking money in excess of $35.00.
Defendants' trucks had been seen leaving the scene
of the crime by the night watchman who gave a
description of the vehicles to the police. On the
basis of this information, defendants were appre-
hended and placed under arrest. The arresting
officers took possession of the keys to the trucks
and turned them over to state police who arrived
about six hours later. The trucks were searched at
this time and about twelve hours later. Both
searches turned up incriminating evidence which
was admitted at trial.
On appeal it was contended that the searches
violated defendants' constitutional rights since
they were conducted without a search warrant.
The court sustained this contention and reversed
citing with approval the following from Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964):
The search of the car was not undertaken un-
til the petitioner and his companions had been
arrested and taken in custody to the police
station and the car had been towed to the ga-
rage. At thispoint there was no danger that any
of the men arrested could have used any weap-
ons in the car or could have destroyed any
evidence of a crime.
Relating this to the case at hand the court said:
Obviously there is a striking similarity be-
tween the vital facts in this case and the
Preston case. There was no search warrant,
the men had been arrested, they had no chance
to escape, there was a lapse of time (much
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more in this case) between the arrest and the
search, and there was no chance that the
articles recovered would be moved or lost.
(411 S.W.2d at 9).
Failure To Admonish The Jury-Sunph v.
Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. Ct. App.
1966). During the trial of the defendant on charges
of voluntary manslaughter, a spectator shouted
out that the witness was lying. Defendant's
attorney did not object nor ask that the jury be
admonished not to consider the outburst. Never-
theless, the appellate court reversed the sentence
and remanded the case for a new trial stating that
the trial judge should have admonished the jury
even without having been requested to do so, and
its failure to do so constituted reversible error.
Prior Grand-Jury Service Does Not Disqualify
Petit Juror-State v. Riley, 151 S.E.2d 308 (W.Va.
1966). Defendant, a school superintendant was
convicted of embezzling funds of the Board of
Education. During the voir dire examination a
number of jurors were challenged for cause; two
of them because they had served on the grand jury
which indicted the defendant of a related crime,
involving the embezzlement of funds from the
same source. The trial court accepted these jurors
after they said they would give the defendant a
fair trial and would not convict him unless he was
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction holding that prior service on a grand
jury which indicted a defendant of a similar
crime does not disqualify a person from sitting on a
petit jury. The Court found that even though
such a juror may be excused without causing error,
failure to excuse is not grounds for reversal. In the
absence of a showing that a juror has formed an
opinion as to the guilt or innocence of this defend-
ant or that the juror would be in some way partial,
the court should not disturb the discretion exer-
cised by the trial court in determining the question
of eligibility of the member of the jury.
Polling And Instructing The Jury Did Not Cure
Prejudice-Cabbiness v. State, 410 S.W.2d 867
(Ark. 1967). After defendant had been arrested
for the burglary of a produce store, the police
returned to his apartment, searched it without a
warrant, and found a revolver and some clothing.
Before trial the defense attorney moved to supress
this evidence as fruit of an illegal search. The trial
judge refused to pass upon the motion, saying that
it was premature and that he would rule on the
admissibility when the evidence was offered. When
it appeared that the State was about to introduce
this evidence, defendant again objected and re-
quested that testimony as to the admissibility of
the evidence be heard in camera. This request was
denied and the witness was permitted to describe
the revolver and the other articles that had been
found in defendant's apartment. After the matter
had thus been brought to the attention of the jury,
the trial judge finally sustained the defense ob-
jection.
Despite this ruling the prosecutor later asked
another witness if the revolver was loaded. The
defendant's objection was sustained but his motion
for a mistrial was denied. Instead the trial judge
polled the jury and was assured by each one that
he could ignore the references to the revolver.
In reversing the lower court's judgment of con-
viction the court said in part:
We are inclined to think that, on balance, the
court's polling of the jury tended to emphasize
the error rather than to correct it. Only a very
unusual and very conscientious juror would
publicly confess himself to be so weak-minded
as to be unable to obey the court's admonition
to disregard certain testimony. The sure way
to avoid the possibility of prejudice is to ex-
clude the incompetent evidence in the first
place.
Aranda Decision Concerning Co-Defendant's
Confession To Be Applied Retroactively-People v.
Charles, 425 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1967). Prior to this case
the Supreme Court of California, in People v.
Aranda, 407 P.2d 265 (1965), outlined certain rules
to alter the practice of introducing confessions
which implicated co-defendants. It was held that
the trial judge should determine whether all parts
of each confession implicating the nondeclarant
could be effectively deleted without prejudice to
the declarant. If this could not be done, he must
either exclude the confessions or severe the trials.
The co-defendants in this case were tried and con-
victed of armed robbery before the Aranda de-
cisions. Both defendants had confessed and the
confessions were admitted into evidence. The
trial judge, however did not follow the Aranda
safeguards. The California Supreme Court held
that Aranda applies to cases on appeal even for
pre-Aranda trials. The conviction of Charles,
however, was affirmed since he had made an in-
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dependent confession under the constitutional
safeguards applicable at that time.
The Court stated that this Court and the Su-
preme Court of the United States have both fol-
lowed, "the historic practice of applying this cur-
rent expression of the basic principle to cases
pending on appeal." (The court added that Mi-
randa and Escobedo were exceptions to this principle
because of the unique circumstances in which those
decisions arose.) The Court stated that its charac-
terization of Aranda as not being constitutionally
compelled did "not bear upon the applicability of
this case on appeal but only upon its automatic
availability for collateral attack." As to the distinc-
tion between substantive and procedural rules the
court stated that they are so "interwoven that their
attempted segregation into clean cut categories
becomes meaningless; ... the hoary dichotomy
between the substantive and procedural cannot
serve as a talismatic solution to the retroactivity
problem."
Facetious Remarks By The Trial Court Judge To
The Jury-Smith v. State, 410 S.W.2d 126 (Ark.
1967). Defendant was convicted in the Circuit
Court of Marion County, Arkansas, for grand
larceny of three hogs, and sentenced to one year in
jail with a recommendation that upon restitution
the sentence be suspended. On appeal, the defend-
ant alleged inter alia that various remarks by the
trial judge influenced the jury's verdict.
After reviewing the colloquy between the judge
and the jury, during the period when the jury had
returned from deliberation to request further
instructions from the court, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas determined that the trial court's remarks
had influenced the jury's verdict. Since the jury
was influenced, the court ordered the conviction
reversed and a new trial.
The dialogue which the court found prejudicial is
too long to be set out here verbatim. However,
the exchange occurred because the jury wished to
find the accused guilty but not sentence him to
prison. When asked about the effect of a recom-
mendation of leniency, the court answered that it
was not bound by, but would give consideration to
such a recommendation. The jury retired, and
later returned to ask if a finding of guilty, fixing
zero years punishment and restitution to the
aggrieved, was acceptable. The judge replied that
it was not, and that the zero years punishment was
a recommendation which did not bind him. When
told this was the holding of the jury the judge noted
that the jury apparently did not trust him. The
jury then returned to the deliberation room and
later returned its verdict of guilty with a recom-
mendation of leniency.
The court noted its "zealous" stand against any
trial judge's remarks that "might influence" a
jury's verdict. It stated that "facetious or not, the
words of the trial judge in the background of the
previous statements on the subject were pre-
judicial", since facetious remarks are not always
taken as such by the hearers.
Although the prior point was dispositive, the
court went on to discuss the appellant's objection
to the trial judge allowing the sheriff to select two
jurors of his choice from the special panel of
twenty-five provided by the jury commissioners to
be used when the regular panel was depleted. The
basis of the defendant's objection was that "the
sheriff was prejudiced because he was a prosecuting
witness". The Court stated that possible prejudice
is not enough, actual prejudice must be shown. In
addition, the record failed to reflect that the appel-
lant had no preemptory challanges available to
object to the proffered jurors.
Emergency Situation Validates Search Without
Warrant-Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486 (Del.
1967). Defendant was convicted of second-degree
murder for beating his victim to death with a
brick. The evidence showed that on the night of
the murder, defendant and the victim had had an
argument after which defendant entered the room
in which the victim was sleeping and beat him
about the head with a brick. The victim was found
the next morning by his employer who was not
sure he was dead. The police were summoned
and informed that a man had been beaten and
might be dead. They thereupon entered the room
where the body had been found and determined
that the victim was indeed dead. While in the
room the police found fragments of the brick and
took pictures of the scene. No other search was
made.
On appeal defendant contended that all evidence
obtained by the officers who entered the room
where the body was found was inadmissible since
no arrest was made and no search warrant for the
particular premises was outstanding. In rejecting
this contention the court stated that the general
rules governing search and seizure are subject to
the exception of emergency situations, sometimes
called the "exigency rule." The circumstances
described amounted to just such an emergency
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situation, and hence evidence found in plain sight
was admissible when gathered pursuant to such
lawful entry. In the words of the court:
Clearly, the police had a good reason to believe
that a life was in the balance and that emer-
gency aid might be needed. Under the circum-
stances, it was the duty of the police to act
forthwith upon the report of the emergency-
not to speculate upon the accuracy of the re-
port or upon the legal technicalities regarding
search warrants. It follows that the entry by
the police was reasonable and lawful.
And further:
The preservation of human life is paramount
to the right of privacy protected by search and
seizure laws and constitutional guaranties;
it is an overriding justification for what other-
wise may be an illegal entry. It follows that a
search warrant is not required to legalize an
entry by police for the purpose of bringing
emergency aid to an injured person.... And
the criterion is the reasonableness of the belief
of the police as to the existence of an emer-
gency, not the existence of an emergency in
fact. 227 A.2d at 489.
Possession By A Bettor Of A Slip As A Memo-
randum Of Own Bets Does Not Violate Lottery
Statute-State v. Melamed, 226 A.2d 636. (N.J.
Super. 1967). Defendant was convicted of violating
a statute making it a misdemeanor to possess any
paper slip or memorandum that "pertains in any
way to the business of lottery." The defense was
that the defendant was merely a bettor not en-
gaged in the bookmaking business and that the
seized papers were his personal memoranda of bets
which he had placed. Defense counsel requested an
instruction that if the papers in question were
merely notations made by the defendant of bets
he had made, they would not constitute memo-
randa pertaining to the business of a lottery. The
trial court refused to give this instruction. The
appellate court held that the instruction was a
proper statement of the law and reversed and
remanded the case with directions that the instruc-
tion be given.
The court stated that "the statute was not
intended to be expanded to include possession by a
bettor of a notation made by him as a private
record of a bet he made on a number. The bettor
as such is not in the policy business." The court
further stated that the defendant was entitled to
an instruction which would have called upon the
jury to decide the issue of whether the memoranda
were in violation of the statute or whether they
were only personal notations.
Argument Of Prosecutor That Defense At-
torney Had Lied Required Reversal-Dupree v.
State, 410 S.W.2d 890 (Tenn. 1967). Defendant was
convicted of assault and battery with intent to
commit rape in the Criminal Court of Shelby
County. On appeal defendant contended that the
statement by the prosecutor that counsel for
defendant had lied when he stated that he would
not have represented defendant if he believed him
guilty, was prejudicial error.
In upholding defendant's contention and revers-
ing, the court stated that even though the expres-
sions of personal belief by defendant's attorney
were violative of the Canons of Professional
Ethics, the prosecutor was not thereby privileged
to commit a further wrong by alluding to those
statements as a lie.
Blood Samples Taken Thirty-Eight Days Prior
To Arrest And Without Consent Inadmissible-
State v. Dasqs, 226 A.2d 873 (N.Y. 1967). Defendant
was involved in an automobile collision on a public
highway and immediately taken to the hospital.
While there a number of blood samples were taken
without his consent, and two were sent to the
police laboratory. They were found to contain a
substantial alcoholic content and as a result an
arrest warrant was issued 38 days after the accident
occurred. At his trial defendant objected to the
admission of the testimony of the doctor who
authorized the blood sample on the grounds that
no consent was given. The evidence was admitted
and defendant was convicted of operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, holding that any testimony regard-
ing the blood samples was inadmissible. Where no
consent is given to the taking of blood, this can
only be done subsequent to or contemporaneous
with a lawful arrest. In this case no consent was
given, nor was there proximity between the arrest
and search, either in time or place. As the court
pointed out, "'It 'will not do' to justify an arrest by
a search and the search by the arrest".
Admission In Evidence Of A Similar Subsequent
Offense And Defendant's Acquittal-People t.
Griffin, 426 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1967). Defendant was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
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death. On appeal, the accused claimed, inter alia,
that the trial judge erred when he allowed evidence
of a similar subsequent offense to be admitted but
excluded evidence of the defendant's acquittal
of that offense.
Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for the Supreme
Court of California agreed with the appellant. The
evidence of the subsequent crime, due to its similar-
ity with the crime charged, was admissible.
The trial court erred, however, in excluding
evidence on the issue of guilt that defendant
was acquitted of the subsequent crime by a
Mexican court. Although there is authority
to the contrary ... the better rule allows
proof of an acquittal to weaken and rebut the
prosecution's evidence of the other crime.
The State contended that the acquittal was the
hearsay opinion of another fact finder drawn from
the evidence adduced at the trial. This objection
was easily met by the Court, which relied upon the
official document exception to the hearsay rule.
It should be noted that in the case at bar a
pivotal point was the proof of intent and the proof
of the Mexican crime was critical, in the eyes of
the Court. "Had the jury been allowed to consider
the determination of the Mexican tribunal, its
consideration of the evidence of that crime would
have been materially affected." Under California
law the error must result in a miscarriage of justice
before the verdict is reversed. The majority felt
there had been such a miscarriage since, if the
evidence in dispute had been admitted, there is a
reasonable possibility that the jury would have
reached a result more favorable to the accused.
Speed Detection By Radar Devices Upheld-
Honeycutt v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 421 (Ky.
App. 1966). Defendant was found guilty of speed-
ing. At trial the arresting officer testified that a
radar device had registered the fact that an auto
was approaching the officer's position at 50 m.p.h.,
15 miles over the speed limit. The officer's visual
observation identified the vehicle as that operated
by the defendant. The officer further testified
that the accuracy of the radar device had been
tested earlier that day by use of a calibrated tuning
fork and by a speedometer check with another
police car. The defendant objected to this testi-
mony because (1) there was no expert testimony of
the scientific validity of the principles of radar
speed detection or that radar is capable of accu-
rately measuring the speed of an auto, (2) the
accuracy of this particular device had not been
proved, and (3) the policeman was not shown to be
qualified to interpret the device.
In affirming the conviction, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals held that a radar operator is qualified
if he has the knowledge to set up, test, and read
the device. It is not necessary that he understand
scientific principles of radar or explain its internal
workings. The court further held that evidence of
the device's accuracy is sufficient if there is un-
contradicted testimony that the device was tested
within a few hours of its specific use and found to
be accurate by use of a calibrated tuning fork and
by a comparison with the speedometer of another
auto driven through the radar field. The court
gave strong support to cases holding that the
accuracy of the radar may be tested by a tuning
fork alone because its accuracy is assumed in the
absence of an attack by defendant. [Citing State
v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 216 A.2d 625 (1966).]
Failure To Prove Continuous Custody Of Breath
Test Specimen Does Not Render It Inadmissible-
State v. Nagel, 226 A.2d 524 (Conn. Cir. Ct. App.
1966). Defendant was convicted of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor. On appeal he contended that the
failure of the State to prove continuous custody of
the breath sample, after it was taken, rendered the
results of subsequent tests inadmissible. The evi-
dence showed that on the day of the arrest the
officer who administered the test sealed the kit,
affixed the identification number "NM9" and
prepared it for mailing. The officer remembered
putting the kit in the office safe but did not rccall
who mailed it to the state toxicologist. The kit
bearing number "NM9" was received three days
later by the toxicologist with the seal unbroken.
On appeal the court held that this statement of
the facts did not reveal any proof that the kit had
actually been tampered with. Thus it assumed that
the test was accurate and rejected defendant's
contention. In the words of the court:
It is not necessary to show that there was an
entire absence of opportunity for anybody to
tamper with it; it is only necessary to show
that the circumstances were such as to estab-
lish a reasonable assurance that it was the
same and in the same condition. (226 A.2d at
526).
Improper Acceptance of Guilty Plea-People v.
Goldfarb, 148 N.W.2d 241 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967).
Defendant was charged with breaking and entering
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and possession of burglary tools. He pleaded guilty
to the charge after having discussed it with his
attorney and in the presence of the attorney. The
District Court judge inquired of the defendant as
to the voluntariness of the plea and then accepted
it.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction on the grounds that the judge's question
to the defendant "Your counsel advises the court
that you wish to plead guilty to possession of
burglary tools, is that correct?", was inadequate
to advise the defendant of the nature and elements
of the crime he was charged with and therefore
vitiated the guilty plea. The court acknowledged
that able counsel was present and that the de-
fendant had been in jail before, but stated that the
requirement of giving adequate warning of the
nature of the crime was mandatory regardless of
any other factors and regardless of who the de-
fendant was.
Comment: The dissent felt that this statement
of the charge while not adequate for an unrepre-
sented youth, was certainly adequate for a man
with a 20 year criminal record and able counsel.
The dissent felt that the intent of the statute was
fulfilled even if the formalities were not.
Indigence Is Relative-Slate v. Tahash, 148
N.W.2d 557 (Minn., 1967). Defendant was con-
victed of grand larceny and appealed on the
grounds that he was denied fundamental fairness.
One of his specific contentions was that he was not
given appointed counsel after requesting it. At the
time of the request the probate court, which ap-
parently had conducted certain pretrial procedures,
found that since the defendant had $25.00 in
cash, a seven year old car, and some equity in 120
acres of land he was not indigent and therefore not
entitled to appointed counsel.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case, mainly on other grounds. In
discussing the indigency issue the court held that
the probate court had been in error and quoted the
United States Supreme Court in Hardy v. United
States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964), that "An accused must
be deemed indigent when at any stage of the pro-
ceedings (his) lack of means... substantially
inhibits him".
Unconstitutional To Deny Counsel A Reasonable
Time To Prepare A Case-Twiford v. Peyton, 372
F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967). The appellant was con-
victed of storebreaking in 1954. Counsel was ap-
pointed to represent the appellant only the day
before the trial and over two and a half months
after his arrest. At the trial, counsel asked for and
was denied a continuance so that he could seek out
a witness whose name had just prior been given
him by the petitioner and whose testimony may
have provided an alibi and established bias on the
part of a prosecution witness. In 1964 the appellant
unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus in
the state courts, claiming a denial of the right to
effective assistance of counsel. The petitioner then
petitioned a federal district court which denied the
writ. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the delay between incarceration and
the appointment of counsel, and the resulting
denial to counsel of a reasonable opportunity to
prepare a case created a prima facie case of denial
of effective assistance of counsel and placed upon
the state the burden of proving lack of prejudice.
The state in the present case failed to meet the
burden by not producing the claimed witness at
the state habeas corpus hearing. The denial of the
continuance in the face of uncontradicted testi-
mony by the appellant at the 1954 trial as to the
existence of the witness and the nature of her
testimony created the necessary inference of
prejudice.
No Advice Of Right To Appointed Counsel For
Appeal-State v. Gruver, 148 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa
1967). Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of
forgery and was sentenced to a term of not more
than 10 years. Defendant appealed pro se and
among his contentions was that he had been denied
appointed counsel.
The Iowa Supreme Court noted that the defend-
ant had court appointed counsel when he pleaded
guilty. The court stated that a defendant is only
entitled to counsel on appeal when he specifically
requests it and held that the lower court was under
no obligation to advise the defendant that he had
the right to make the request and that counsel
would be appointed if he did so.
Comment: The Iowa Supreme Court cites several
of the United States Supreme Court decisions in
this area of the right of counsel and points to the
fact that nowhere in the language of the cases is
there a requirement that the defendant be advised
of his right to appointed counsel on appeal. While
it may be true that none of the cases require, as a
constitutional standard, the advising of the de-
fendant of this right, the decision of the Iowa
court is certainly a step backwards from the ob-
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vious intent of these cases to provide all persons
an equal opportunity to obtain justice.
Mere Appearance At Trial Without Counsel Not
Deemed An Effective Waiver Of Right To Counsel
-Cuevas v. Wilson, 264 F.Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal.
1966). Petitioner in 1963 was convicted in Cali-
fornia of two counts of unlawful sale of narcotics.
California law required the state to impose a
heavier sentence where the defendant had pre-
viously been convicted of a similar offense. The
petitioner had a similar prior conviction in 1958.
In a habeas corpus proceeding the petitioner
alleged that he was in custody in violation of his
constitutional rights because in the 1958 prosecu-
tion he was denied counsel at a critical stage of the
criminal proceedings, and if the 1958 conviction
were to be set aside he would have been illegally
sentenced as a second offender in 1963 and entitled
to apply for immediate release on parole.
In the 1958 prosecution the petitioner was pro-
vided with counsel from the public defender's
office. Petitioner appeared in court and pleaded not
guilty and was subsequently released on bail.
Later the petitioner again appeared in court and
was told by the judge that as he had been bailed
out it was "no longer a case for the Public De-
fender", whereupon the public defender's office
was relieved from further represention of the
petitioner. The court, however, did ask the peti-
tioner if he desired to secure his own attorney. The
petitioner responded affirmatively and a date for
the trial was set. The petitioner appeared on the
trial date unaccompanied by an attorney and
changed his plea to guilty, which was accepted and
entered by the court. The court did not ask the
petitioner whether he had an attorney, whether
he could afford an attorney or whether he wished
to proceed without an attorney. The United
States District Court held that the petitioner was
denied his constitutional right to counsel since the
".... petitioner's mere appearance in court without
counsel cannot be deemed to constitute an effective
waiver of his right to the assistance of either ap-
pointed or retained counsel".
Reaquisition Of Jurisdiction Over An Extradited
Prisoner-Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003 (5th
Cir. 1967). Petitioner was convicted in Gray
County, Texas, for two felonies, in May, 1933, and
sentenced to a total of twenty years in prison. In
November of the same year petitioner was con-
victed in Wheeler County, Texas, for a felony and
sentenced to twenty years in prison to be served
consecutively to the first two convictions. After
serving approximately one year of the forty-year
term, the Governor of Texas granted the prisoner a
short "furlough", and notified Louisiana law-
enforcement authorities because the petitioner had
escaped from a Louisiana penal institution prior to
his Texas convictions. Rather than accepting the
"furlough", the prisoner signed a waiver of extradi-
tion and served his sentence in Louisiana. He was
released from the Louisiana penitentiary on parole,
which was concluded in 1948. Petitioner was sub-
sequently convicted of passing a forged instrument.
Petitioner was sentenced to two years plus the
time not served for the 1933 convictions.
The prisoner applied for a writ of habeas corpus
to the Texas Court of Appeals because of his in-
carceration for the 1933 convictions. The writ was
denied. The prisoner then applied for a writ of
habeas corpus on the grounds that his incarcera-
tion under the 1933 Texas convictions was a
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right of
Due Process. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas denied the
petition. On appeal the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower
court, holding that "the extradition of Shields to
Louisiana authorities and the release by Texas of
the prisoner before expiration of his sentence con-
stituted a waiver of jurisdiction over Shields".
The court, after some introductory remarks
about Due Process and fundamental justice, re-
viewed the case law and came to the conclusion
that Texas had, in effect, impliedly pardoned the
petitioner when it allowed him to be extradited
while serving a prison sentence. The Court placed
heavy reliance upon the fact that the surrendering
state at the time of extradition;
showed no interest in the return of the pris-
oner, either by agreement between the sover-
eigns, by detainer, or any other affirmative
action taken by it following his release in
Louisiana.
The other factor which the court stressed was
that the lack of interest demonstrated by the
State of Texas lasted twenty-eight years. "A
prisoner cannot be required to serve his sentence in
installments" are the words the opinion used to
sum up its feelings on this point.
Since the lack of interest for a long period of
time was held to be equivalent to a pardon or
commutation, and a waiver of jurisdiction, the
Texas court which heard the forgery case in 1960
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was without power to force the petitioner to serve
the balance of his 1933 sentences.
Equal Protection And The Unequal Treatment
Of Those Who Can Not Procure Bail-Priest v.
State, 227 A.2d 576 (Del. 1967). Defendant was
arrested and charged with auto theft. Bail was set
at five-hundred dollars. The accused was unable
to post bail. During the ensuing detention, Priest
was interrogated heavily, and in violation of var-
ious statutory and court propounded rules. After
five months of imprisonment, the defendant was
tried and convicted. He was given a suspended
sentence and probation. On appeal, the defendant
contended, inter alia, that he was denied Equal
Protection of the law "in that, because he was
unable to furnish bail, he was subjected to police
interrogation to which another defendant, able to
post bail, would not have been exposed."
Justice Hermann, writing a unanimous opinion
for the Supreme Court of Delaware, stated that
"the defendant cites no authority in support of this
argument. The contention is without merit."
The opinion continued that the Equal Protection
Clause does not necessitate that all have the same
rights and protections, but that all be treated
identically as to the "privileges conferred and
liabilities conferred." This Court felt that "it
forbids invidious discrimination, but doth not
require identical treatment for all persons without
recognition of differences in relevant circum-
stances." The Clause, the Court said, prevents
invidious discrimination. The Eighth Amendment
of the Constitution permits the discriminatory
classification between those who can obtain their
release on bail and those who can not. Hence, this
classification is not prohibited by the Constitu-
tional Clause of Equal Protection.
Quoting the case of Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d
710 (3d Cir. 1965), the Court said, "the Constitu-
tion, however, permits such a classification, and
any differences here, arise solely because of the
inherent characteristics of confinement and cannot
constitute invidious discrimination."
Comment: The accused was placed in jail
pending trial. Jail is a place where convicted
criminals are placed to be rehabilitated and
punished. The accused was incarcerated because
he could not adequately assure the court that he
would appear at his trial. Should he then be placed
in a jail? Does not jail restrict the accused to a
greater extent than necessary to insure his ap-
pearance in court?
Another point is that even if the incarcerated
can be discriminated against under the Constitu-
tion, surely he can not be prejudiced to such a
degree that he will be convicted where a man freed
on bail would not be convicted. Such a disad-
vantage to the poor is unthinkable in our present
system.
Felony-Murder Rule Encompasses Accidental
Killing During Robbery Escape-Whitman v.
People, 420 P.2d 416 (Colo. 1966). The evidence
advanced at defendant's trial tended to show that
he and another party undertook to rob a creamery.
Although the other person actually perpetrated
the holdup, he used defendant's gun and defendant
drove the car which enabled them to escape. The
police were signaled by the victim and began chas-
ing the robbers. During the chase defendant's
car struck another car killing the driver. Defendant
was arrested and convicted of felony-murder under
a Colorado statute which provides, that a "Murder
... which is committed in perpetration or attempt
to perpetuate any.., shall be deemed murder in
the first degree." Defendant contended on appeal:
(1) that there was insufficient evidence to show
that a murder was committed in perpetration of
the robbery; and (2) that the "perpetration of a
robbery" does not encompass the subsequent
escape.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed de-
fendant's conviction, holding that the felony-
murder doctrine eliminates the necessity of proving
the elements of deliberation and design to effect
death under the statute. It quoted Andrews v.
People, 33 Colo. 193, 79 P. 1031 (1905) for this
theory. The Andrews court held that "the purpose
of the statute was to make every homicide comitted
in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate certain
felonies, murder, which may be punished by death,
if the jury so determine, without regard to malice,
deliberation, or premeditation".
The majority of the Colorado Supreme Court
went on to hold that the escape is as much a part of
the perpetration of the crime as the actual holdup
itself. This is true even under the more lenient
"furtherance of the felony" test adopted by prior
Pennsylvania cases. See, Commonwealth v. Redline,
391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
Court's Right To Limit Press Coverage Within
Courthouse Upheld-Seyimour v. United States, 373
F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967). Defendant was convicted
of criminal contempt when he disobeyed a standing
